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Abstract The sixteenth century French humanist writer Etienne de La Boétie has 
not often been considered in literature on republican political thought, despite his 
famous essay, Discours de la Servitude Volontaire, displaying a number of clear 
republican tropes and themes, being largely concerned with the problem of arbitrary 
power embodied the figure of the tyrant. Yet, I argue that the real significance of La 
Boétie’s text is in his radical concept of voluntary servitude and the way it adds a new 
dimension to the neo-republican theory of liberty as non-domination. The problem of 
self-domination or wilful obedience to authority is a form of ideological domination 
that Pettit’s understanding of arbitrary power relationships between agents does not 
adequately account for. Furthermore, La Boétie shows that freedom is an ontological 
condition and is realised not – or not entirely - through the rule of law as the 
guarantee against arbitrariness, as neo-republicans advocate, but rather through acts of 
self-emancipation and civil disobedience. Here I understand La Boétie’s thinking in 
terms of a certain anarcho-republicanism in which the promotion of freedom depends 
not so much on institutions, as Pettit suggests, but rather on autonomous relations of 
friendship, love and solidarity between individuals. 
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La Boétie and Republican Liberty: Voluntary Servitude and Non-
Domination 
 
 
‘The plain fact is that to be subject of a master who always has the power to be 
wicked, and who can therefore never be relied upon to be good, is an extreme 
misfortune…’  (La Boétie 1988: 37)1 
 
In his essay on friendship, ‘De l’amitié’, devoted to his late friend Etienne de La 
Boétie, Michel de Montaigne refers to La Boétie’s famous work, ‘Discours de la 
Servitude Volontaire’ (‘Discourse on Voluntary Servitude’) as a discourse written ‘in 
honour of liberty against tyrants’. (1877: XXVII) In this text, La Boétie outlines a 
theory of tyranny, domination and freedom that, I suggest, reflects many of the 
themes of republican political thought, despite his general absence in the scholarship 
on that tradition.  
This paper explores the importance that La Boétie’s consideration of tyranny has 
specifically for the modern neo-republican understanding of freedom as non-
domination. Here, domination is defined by Quentin Skinner and, especially, by 
Philip Pettit, in terms of the arbitrary power relationships that produce a condition of 
dependency, insecurity and a consequent loss of freedom. While showing that La 
Boétie shares this concern with arbitrariness, particularly in relation to the experience 
of living under the tyrant’s rule, I will argue that his key concept of voluntary 
servitude or wilful obedience deepens and problematises the neo-republican account 
of domination. By showing how our submission to the arbitrary rule of another might 
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be voluntary rather than coerced, La Boétie adds a new and hitherto neglected 
dimension to this understanding of power. He highlights the limits of the neo-
republican model of domination, opening up a troubling set of questions about why 
people willingly abandon their own freedom and voluntarily submit to relationships of 
power and authority in the first place. La Boétie’s notion of voluntary servitude 
reveals a phenomenon of power that the neo-republican model does not account for – 
a desire for one’s own domination that allows power relations to take hold and to be 
sustained. La Boétie sees this as a perverted desire, a form of psychic sickness or 
moral weakness – a view that has clear parallels with earlier republican concerns 
about moral corruption and the loss of civic virtue, but which has been largely 
neglected in modern neo-republican theory. 
My claim in this paper is that La Boétie’s radical notion of voluntary servitude 
presents a significant challenge to the neo-republican model of freedom as non-
domination or the absence of arbitrary rule. Firstly, if the power of the tyrant or 
master is really based on the voluntary consent of the subject, then this means that 
power is a specular illusion sustained by continual obedience. Secondly, the 
phenomenon of voluntary servitude shows that freedom is never entirely absent, even 
in relationships of domination. Rather, it is the permanent ontological condition of the 
subject, needing only to be acknowledged within oneself and thus activated. This 
means that, contra Pettit, one is essentially free even if one is subject to arbitrary 
interference. So, for La Boétie, the answer to domination lies not, or not entirely, in 
the existence of institutions that protect the individual from arbitrary power – as Pettit 
advocates - but rather in the negative gesture of refusing power and withdrawing 
one’s obedience to it. In contrast to the neo-republican insistence that liberty can only 
be come about in a ‘free state’ governed by laws, La Boétie places greater emphasis 
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on acts of civil disobedience and self-emancipation. His notion of freedom, so far 
from being dependent on the patterning of institutions, is closer to a form of de-
instituting power that disturbs the foundations of political authority.  
This argument proceeds in four stages. First, I introduce La Boétie’s theory of 
voluntary servitude, showing how the rule of the tyrant is actually dependent on the 
self-abandonment and self-domination of those who obey him. Secondly, I 
demonstrate La Boétie’s relevance and importance to the republican tradition - 
particularly to its concern about arbitrary rule - through a consideration of his 
description of the experience of courtiers living under the tyrant’s capricious will. In 
the third section, I show how, despite their shared concerns about arbitrariness, La 
Boétie’s problematic of voluntary servitude both unsettles and extends the neo-
republican model of freedom, revealing some of the limitations in Pettit’s account of 
dominating power relationships. Here I contrast Pettit’s emphasis on institutional 
safeguards against arbitrariness with La Boétie’s emphasis on self-emancipation and 
civil disobedience. The final section develops an alternative ‘anarcho-republican’ 
theory of freedom, drawing on La Boétie’s theme of friendship. Central here is an 
anarchist ‘civic virtue’ – based on relations of solidarity and love between 
autonomous individuals - which, I argue, is a better safeguard against the threat of 
domination than the reliance on institutions and laws. 
The Discours 
Étienne de La Boétie was a poet and writer in the humanist tradition, a translator of 
Plutarch and Xenophon, and a member of the Parlement of Bordeaux. His most 
famous work, Discours de la Servitude Volontaire, was written around 1549 when he 
was a law student at the University of Orleans (see Bonnefon 1892). Since then the 
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text has had a complex and ambiguous history (see Gontabert 1983), being 
clandestinely circulated by Hugenots and monarchomachs who used it for 
propagandistic purposes in their struggle against the French crown. It has been seen as 
call to resistance against unjust tyrannical rule, and it had a significant impact on the 
tradition of political dissent and civil disobedience (see Bleiker 2000),2 being also 
influential amongst libertarians and anarchists. Indeed, the text itself was written 
against the background of popular revolts against the French king Henry II in protest 
against the imposition of the gabelle or salt tax. While Montaigne (1877: XXVII ) 
condemned the radical political ends to which La Boétie’s Discours was being 
posthumously applied, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that this was indeed a 
revolutionary work in which political power is subjected to a devastating critique. 
The text begins with a radical reversal of Ulysses’ exhortation to his mutinous 
soldiers, that there is no good in having several masters and that it is more convenient 
to simply obey one. To this La Boétie (1988: 37) responds:  
If Ulysses had said nothing simply said ‘Having several lords is no good 
thing’, then he could have said nothing better. He ought to have gone on to 
show why domination by several people cannot be a good thing: the reason is 
that if you call anyone ‘master’, even if it is only one man, he will become 
harsh and unreasonable simply because he has been given that title. 
For La Boétie, in other words, obedience to any master, one or many, is an evil to be 
avoided. The remedy to the inconvenience of obeying several masters is not to obey 
just one, as Ulysses urges, but to obey none at all. Central to the text, then, is a 
critique of obedience to any kind of absolute political authority, whether to the will of 
a tyrant or a hereditary monarch; the distinction between them is essentially collapsed. 
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Any kind of submission to the master, no matter how benign, is likely to result in an 
abuse of power. Of particular concern to La Boétie is the relationship of tyranny – the 
arbitrary rule of the one over the many.3 The problem identified by La Boétie is when 
the many, whose natural condition is one of freedom and plurality, come under the 
power and influence of the One and are absorbed into an artificial totality in which 
their liberty is alienated and the natural bonds of companionship and solidarity are 
destroyed.  
Yet the strident anti-authoritarian political message of La Boétie’s text is complicated 
by the phenomenon of voluntary servitude, which constitutes the central theme of his 
work. The true problem of political domination does not lie in the figure of the tyrant, 
who is only a single individual, but rather in the voluntary submission of those who 
obey him. The power of the tyrant over his people is no more than the power they 
bestow upon him. So, in asking the seemingly simple question - why people obey 
even when it is patently against their interests to do so - La Boétie encounters one of 
the fundamental enigmas of political authority:  
My sole aim on this occasion is to discover how it can happen that a vast 
number of individuals, of towns, cities and nations can allow one man to 
tyrannise them, a man who has no more power except the power they 
themselves give him, who could do them no harm were they not willing to 
suffer harm, and who could never wrong them were they not more ready to 
endure it than to stand in his way. It is a grievous matter – and yet so 
commonplace that our sorrow is greater and our surprise the less – to see a 
million men in abject servitude, their necks bound to the yoke, and in that state 
not because they have had to yield to some greater force but, it seems, because 
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they have been mesmerised by the mere name of a single man, a man they 
ought neither to fear (for he is just one man) nor love (as he is inhuman and 
barbaric towards them). (1988: 38) 
The main point here is that our obedience to the tyrant, who lords it over us, is not 
coerced but freely given. We willingly submit to his authority and allow him to abuse 
us, voluntarily abandoning our own freedom. Therefore, the power the tyrant wields 
over us is only the power we freely endow him with. According to La Boétie, this 
phenomenon cannot be explained by cowardice, which, while condemnable, would be 
in some ways understandable. However, in the situation La Boétie describes, the 
people outnumber the lonely figure of the tyrant to such an extent that cowardice 
simply cannot explain their submission. They could easily overpower him if they 
chose, but do not do so. Instead, they immolate their own freedom and choose to live 
as slaves: ‘It is the people who enslave themselves, who cut their own throats, who, 
faced with a choice between servitude and freedom, abandon their own liberty and 
accept the yoke, who consent to being harmed – or rather, seek to be harmed’. (La 
Boétie 1988: 41) Something other than cowardice must be at work here – a strange 
psychological mechanism, a moral sickness or vice that La Boétie is confounded by 
and struggles to name: ‘What words can describe this vice, this misfortune (or rather 
vice and misfortune!) whereby the obedience of an infinite number of people 
degenerates into servitude…’ (39) The Discours thus overturns standard notions of 
consent that claim that it is natural and rational to obey authority; for La Boétie, 
voluntary consent is a genuine mystery, a puzzle to be solved, and an evil to be 
remedied. 
La Boétie and republicanism 
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As I shall go on to argue, La Boétie’s diagnosis of the problem of voluntary servitude 
adds a new dimension to the republican concern about domination, arbitrary rule and 
dependency.  Although La Boétie’s text has generally been overlooked in the 
scholarship on republicanism,4 it contains themes that align it closely with the 
republican and civic humanist tradition (see Podoksik 2003: 83-95). There are the 
usual references to the classical republican tropes of free city states, Athens, Sparta, 
and Rome, and even to Plato’s ideal republic. The classical figures of tyrants and 
tyrannicides populate the essay: tyrants such as Caesar, Nero and Tiberius are 
denounced for their cruelty and depravity, while tyrannicides like Brutus and Cassius 
are praised for their courage and virtue. La Boétie invokes notions of a manly and 
patriotic civic virtue in contrast to the corruption and moral degeneracy of the tyrant. 
The natural and healthy disposition toward freedom, brotherly equality and friendship 
is contrasted with the artificiality of tyranny and political domination. The tyrant is 
depicted as lustful yet impotent, brutal and cruel yet cowardly and effeminate; ‘a 
solitary weakling, and usually the most cowardly and effeminate in the land, who is 
unaccustomed to the dust of battle and has hardly even eyes set on the sand of the 
jousting arena, and who has no authority to issue orders to men since he is but the 
abject slave of some pitiful little woman!’ (39)  
Yet, the real target of La Boétie’s critique is not the tyrant himself, who is simply the 
effect of those who obey and serve him (he is not a ‘Hercules’ or a ‘Samson’ but a 
‘single man’), but rather the abandonment of liberty that makes the relationship of 
tyranny possible. La Boétie simply cannot understand why people would choose to 
exchange their freedom, to which they have a natural disposition, for the unnatural 
condition of servitude and obedience, in which their property and their very lives are 
put at risk. While the tyrant is a vile figure, real culpability for tyranny lies with those 
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who blindly obey him, who are stupefied by and enthralled to him, and who serve him 
in the hope of winning privileges and favors. Of particular interest here are the 
courtiers who surround the tyrant, who enjoy a certain status and privileges and yet 
who have no freedom and live in constant insecurity and fear. Their fawning and 
flattery are designed to anticipate the whims of their master. La Boétie describes this 
condition:  
But the courtiers of the tyrant ingratiate themselves with him and beg favours 
of him, and the tyrant, seeing this requires them not just to do what he says but 
to think the way he wants them to and, often, to anticipate his desires. It is not 
enough that these people obey him, they must also please him in every way, 
they must endure hardship, torment themselves and drive themselves to the 
grave in carrying out his business; his pleasure must be their pleasure, his 
tastes must be theirs, they must distort and cast off their natural disposition, 
they must hang on his every words, his tone of voice, his gestures, his 
expression; their every faculty must be alert to catch his wishes and to discern 
his thoughts. (66) 
Such is the unhappy existence of those who make a devil’s bargain with the tyrant; in 
agreeing to serve him, and in sacrificing freedom and independence for the promise of 
favours and rewards, they live a life of insecurity and anxiety. This is the fate of all 
those who enter into the artificial and corrupted atmosphere of the tyrant.  
Voluntary servitude and non-domination 
La Boétie’s account of the loss of freedom that comes with living according to the 
arbitrary whims of another has a striking resonance with the neo-republican theory of 
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liberty as non-domination. According to this theory, what diminishes or negates 
liberty is not so much interference or constraint, as proponents of negative liberty 
would suggest, but rather the relationship of domination defined by a condition of 
dependency and insecurity. While someone subjected to domination - a slave or a 
servant for instance - might not be directly interfered with by her master, she 
nevertheless lives under an arbitrary relation of power and dependency in which she 
has no security of liberty. In other words, there is no guarantee that the master, who 
previously had shown forbearance, might suddenly start to interfere with the actions 
of those under his power. The slave is thus entirely at the mercy of the whims of her 
master, and it is this uncertainty and insecurity – the fact that she is under an unequal 
and arbitrary relationship of power – rather than the actuality of interference or 
coercion itself, which renders her unfree. Therefore, to be free on the republican 
account is to have security of liberty, and this only comes with a measure of 
independence. Freedom means being able to enjoy a certain level of equality and to 
have guarantees and safeguards against arbitrary power, safeguards usually provided 
by the rule of law.  
Quentin Skinner’s (1998) historical reconstruction of the neo-Roman tradition traces 
the emergence and development of this particular conception of liberty from ancient 
Roman legal thought, through to the idea of libertas in the Italian Renaissance, to the 
republican impulse of Machiavelli’s Discorsi, and later to defenders of the idea of the 
republican commonwealth in England during and after the Civil War. Central to this 
was the republican idea of the free state and the claim that one could only be free if 
one lived under a set of fixed laws and institutional arrangements, such as a 
constitution and separated powers, which worked for the public good and were 
designed to safeguard against the threat of arbitrary rule. By contrast, to live under a 
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system that allows governments to exercise discretionary or prerogative power was to 
live as a slave. Therefore, what really threatened liberty for the republican – and this 
marks the difference from negative libertarians like Hobbes – is not law and legal 
interference as such but, on the contrary, the very absence of the rule of law (see 
Viroli 2002: 47). 
The advantage of living under a stable and regular system of rules and institutions, as 
opposed to the arbitrary will of a master, is that one gains a greater sense of certainty, 
security and therefore of independence. According to Philip Pettit, this form of 
freedom means not having to live in a state of dependency and not having to engage 
in strategic behaviors designed to anticipate the whims of one’s master. By contrast,  
to suffer the reality or expectation of arbitrary interference is not only to have to 
endure a high level of uncertainty. It is also to have to keep a weather eye on the 
powerful, anticipating what they will expect of you and trying to please them, or 
anticipating where they will be and trying to stay out of their way; it is to have 
strategic deference and anticipation forced upon you at every point. You can 
never sail on, unconcerned, in the pursuit of your own affairs; you have to 
navigate an area that is mined on all sides with dangers (Pettit 1997: 86). 
We are reminded of La Boétie’s description of courtiers who have to tiptoe around the 
tyrant, ever fearful of incurring his disfavor, constantly on their guard and always 
having to wear a mask and conceal their true feelings. For La Boétie, as well as for 
proponents of republican liberty, the experience of domination that comes with living 
under arbitrary rule is the very antithesis of freedom. 
However, despite this shared concern with arbitrary power, I would argue that La 
 12 
Boétie’s concept of voluntary servitude profoundly disturbs the neo-republican model 
of freedom and domination. La Boétie’s contention that one’s domination can be 
actively willed, and that the tyrant’s power is freely consented to, opens up a new and 
troubling set of questions about the relationship between freedom and domination. 
Indeed, if dominating power relationships are based on free consent, then the very line 
between freedom and unfreedom becomes blurred and ambiguous. What does the idea 
that living under tyrannical rule might be a matter of choice, rather than coercion, do 
to the republican understanding of domination? Can the republican notion of freedom 
as non-domination accommodate the possibility that freedom might, in some 
instances, be freely abandoned? While neo-republican theory pays attention to the 
psychological effects of living under arbitrary power – the anxiety, uncertainty, the 
need to dissimulate, conceal and be constantly on one’s guard – what is generally 
lacking in this account is the subjective mechanism – what we might call a passionate 
attachment to domination - that leads to that abandonment of freedom in the first 
place.  
One of the problems with Pettit’s theory is that in seeing domination largely in terms 
of top-down inter-subjective relationships between agents – exemplified by the 
master-servant relationship – it simply cannot account for the multiplicity of forms 
that domination can take in modern societies. It cannot adequately explain domination 
as an effect of more abstract and anonymous social processes and structures, such as 
the functioning of the capitalist market, or the domination associated with the shaping 
of consciousness and the habits of obedience to authority that come with the 
disciplining power of social institutions (see Haugaard and Pettit 2017: 25-39). 
Drawing on Max Weber’s account of the way that modern ‘rational’ forms of 
authority depend on a recognition of ‘legitimacy’, Michael J. Thompson points to this 
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other dimension of domination:  
it means that there is some degree of obedient acceptance of domination that 
becomes a routinized, habitual character of modern society… In this respect, 
domination requires not an arbitrary exercise of power as Pettit suggests, but, 
rather, the opposite: a defined set of behaviours which are ingrained within the 
agent through a process of ‘routinization’ [Veralltäglichung] wherein the 
subjective orientations of individuals make up a constitutive part of the presence 
of domination (Thompson 2013: 285).  
Yet, this is exactly the dimension of domination one encounters in La Boétie’s 
conception of voluntary servitude. Indeed, one of his chief explanations for this 
phenomenon is that, although freedom is our natural condition, we can become so 
habituated into servitude that we eventually forget our original predisposition and 
come to assume that obedience is natural to us: ‘Men born under the yoke and 
educated in slavery will look no further; they are content to live in the condition in 
which they were born, with no other possessions and entitlements, and to assume that 
this condition is one that nature ordains.’ (49) Therefore, domination and the loss of 
freedom come about through the habit of obeying and the internalisation of discipline, 
such that what was hitherto unnatural to us now seems natural and legitimate.  
Consent and obedience to authority are also sustained, according to La Boétie, 
through certain ritualistic displays and spectacles that have the power to charm and 
seduce us:  
Theatres, games, farces, spectacles, gladiators, strange beasts, medals, tableaux 
and other such drugs were the bait that lured ancient nations into servitude, they 
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were the price at which freedom was sold, they were the instruments of tyranny; 
they were the methods, the procedures, the allurements which ancient tyrants 
could use to put their people to sleep, to place them under the yoke. Thus, these 
foolish people, finding these pastimes enjoyable, taken in by the idle pleasures 
that met their gaze, became accustomed to slavery…(58). 
La Boétie here is pointing to a kind of ideological domination which, while it might 
be different to Weber’s understanding of the functioning of modern rational authority 
– it would be more like his notion of ‘charismatic authority’ – is still very much at 
work in contemporary societies, in the form of the seductions of consumerism, 
advertising, social media fetishism, and entertainment, media, sporting and political 
spectacles, which today have the power to charm, enthrall and pacify us just like the 
‘bread and circuses’ of the ancients. 
Lastly, La Boétie seeks to explain voluntary servitude in terms of a certain network of 
dependencies surrounding the tyrant. As La Boétie shows, the true power of the tyrant 
lies not in coercion – not in his sentries and guards with their halberds – but rather in 
a complex ecosystem of relations: those immediately surrounding the tyrant, his 
advisers and counsellors, who have his ear and are complicit in his crimes; these in 
turn maintain a network of dependents and lackeys; and below them are hundreds and 
thousands of others, each with his own little place within this great pyramid of power. 
Thus, the power of the tyrant is really based on an interlocking system of relations of 
fear and dependency that includes many thousands of people, who are all complicit in 
their own domination. As La Boétie says: ‘After that, you have a great crowd of other 
people, and anyone who unravels this thread will see that it is not just six thousand 
who are connected to the tyrant, but hundreds of thousands, millions. And the tyrant 
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makes use of this cord.’ (64) Tyranny is thus sustained by a complex web of 
interlocking interests. 
The point is that these various forms of domination identified by La Boétie - learnt 
habits of obedience, the ideological manufacturing of consent, and complex social 
structures comprising chains of interlocking and mutually sustaining dependencies 
and interests - are not adequately addressed in Pettit’s account, where the focus is on 
relations and interactions between specific agents (see Pettit 52). 
Thompson, in his critique of the limitations of Pettit’s account of domination, 
attempts to develop an alternative and more complex model combining three different 
dimensions of domination: coercion, which he believes Pettit’s notion is largely 
confined to; authority, in which domination depends on the recognition of power’s 
legitimacy by those who are subjected to it; and extraction, which refers to practices 
of economic exploitation and the ability of one to extract use and benefit from another 
(Thompson 289). My claim here is that we must add to this a fourth dimension, one 
that underpins all the others – and this is the dimension of voluntary servitude itself. 
The truly radical implication of La Boétie’s theory is that no power relationship, no 
matter how dominating, coercive or seemingly one-sided, is possible without our 
voluntary acquiescence and consent. We must ask the basic question: how is it 
possible for the capitalist to exploit the worker, or for the individual to be either 
coerced, lulled, inured or seduced into obedience without the subject’s consent? In 
other words, we can add to these other forms of domination the most enigmatic one of 
all – self-domination; the abrogation of our own freedom and our willing 
subordination to power. While Thompson points to the way that domination might be 
the effect of ‘imbalances in social and political power, not the cause of them’ (280) – 
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La Boétie takes us even further down this road of enquiry and forces us to ask a more 
difficult question: might it not be the case that these imbalances in social and political 
power are themselves an effect of our abandonment of our own freedom and our 
desire to be dominated? Might not all power relations ultimately be based on free 
consent, rather than coercion? Yet, one of the mysteries of voluntary servitude is that, 
as La Boétie shows, obedience is not a passive or static condition but, on the contrary, 
relies on an active and ongoing giving of consent, a constant repetition of behaviors of 
obedience. There is, at the heart of domination, a strange frenzy of obedience and a 
passionate and energetic embrace of one’s own subjugation: ‘the more that tyrants 
pillage, they more they exact and extort, the more they ruin and destroy, the more you 
give them, the more you subject yourself to them – so much the stronger they 
become…’ (42). 
However, this insight produces an even more startling conclusion: power is an 
illusion. Even as power seems to bear down upon the subject, either in the form of 
direct coercion or, as concerns us more here, in one’s awareness of its arbitrary 
nature, La Boétie reminds us that this domination is only made possible insofar as we 
consent to it. Indeed, power is actually constituted by our voluntary servitude. La 
Boétie says of the tyrant:  
Where did he get those eyes which spy on you, if you did not give him them? 
Would he have all those hands to strike you with, if he did not get them from 
you? Those feet which trample upon your cities, where did he get them if they 
are not your own? What power has he over you, if it is not the power you give 
him? (43) 
It is as if the entire body politic of the tyrant is a specular illusion made up of wills 
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and capacities of individuals who, captivated by the image of the One, are absorbed 
into an imaginary totality that they at the same time constitute. While the image here 
of the collective body of the tyrant might seem Hobbesian, it is also deeply 
ambiguous in the way it disturbs, rather than affirms, the foundations of political 
authority. The radical insight of La Boétie’s analysis is that power does not really 
exist – or rather that its existence really depends on the power of those subjected to it 
- and is therefore simply the alienating and illusory effect of their abandonment of 
their own power over themselves.  
This realisation introduces a very real instability into model of domination central to 
neo-republican thought, in which it is assumed that domination is a fixed, hierarchical 
relationship between master and servant, and that the master in this situation enjoys a 
real power over his servant. However, La Boétie shows that this relationship is 
actually very fragile and can be overturned through the withdrawal of consent: ‘I am 
not asking you to push him out of your way, to topple him; just stop propping him up 
and, like a great colossus whose plinth has been taken from under him, he will 
crumble and be shattered under his own weight.’ (44).  
While this no doubt raises many practical questions about the collective organisation 
of dissent – questions that La Boétie is keenly aware of, as indicated by his analysis of 
the trenchancy with which habits of obedience take hold and the ease with which 
freedom is forgotten5 – the emphasis here is on a kind of self-emancipation, which is 
the ontological condition for any external act of resistance. 
The emancipation of the self 
What becomes clear from La Boétie’s theory of voluntary servitude is that domination 
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is primarily a relationship one has with oneself, rather than with an external master. If, 
in other words, the tyrant’s power really lies in the power of those who obey him, 
then domination is to be explained in terms of an abandonment of one’s will to be free 
and an abrogation of one’s own power over oneself. Here La Boétie reflects a concern 
central to an older republican tradition – shared, for instance, by thinkers like 
Spinoza6 and Machiavelli7 – about the way that people can lose their desire for 
freedom; something that was understood as a form of corruption, degeneracy and the 
loss of virtue. Yet, as La Boétie shows, freedom lost can be regained by the renewal 
of one’s will to be free. Freedom from domination is essentially a matter of willing to 
be free, and of recognising that one had the power all along but just didn’t know it: 
‘But you can deliver yourselves if you make an effort – not an effort to deliver 
yourselves, but an effort to want to do so!’ (44) The distinction between – or rather 
the prioritisation of – the effort to will and the effort to act is important here. The 
seemingly immutable and one-sided relationship of mastery is created and sustained 
by our recognition of the master; to free ourselves from this relationship we must will 
our own freedom, which means turning our gaze away from the master, whereupon 
his power is exposed as an empty gesture. The story of voluntary servitude is really a 
story of our will to be free: how we once desired and enjoyed freedom, how we 
subsequently lost the will to be free, and how we might regain it. The ending of the 
relationship of domination is the withdrawal of voluntary servitude.  
La Boétie’s understanding of freedom as an act of will departs from that of the neo-
republicans in two key respects. First, for La Boétie, freedom is understood as the 
ontological condition of the subject, a permanent potentiality that exists in all 
situations, even in relationships of domination; whereas from the neo-republican 
perspective freedom is something that depends on external conditions, that is, on the 
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existence of institutions that safeguard against arbitrary power. Secondly, and 
relatedly, the realisation of freedom is a matter of self-emancipation: not so much, or 
not only, being emancipated from the external condition of tyranny but, rather, 
emancipating oneself from one’s own voluntary obedience, from one’s listlessness, 
lack of moral energy or, as we have seen, from that active and frenzied state of 
abandonment and forgetfulness that also makes one complicit in one’s own 
subjugation.  
This is very different from the neo-republican insistence that freedom is a matter of 
having the right kinds of institutions to protect the individual from arbitrary power. 
Republican liberty, as we have seen, is premised on the idea of the ‘free state’ – in 
other words, a polity governed by a set of constitutional arrangements designed to 
ward off prerogative power. Indeed, Pettit sees non-domination in terms of a certain 
form of non-arbitrary power or constitutional authority intended to prevent other 
parties’ arbitrary interference. Although this constitutional authority might interfere 
with other parties, even on a regular basis, this does not amount to domination, 
according to Pettit, because it does so in such a way that ‘tracks their interests’- in 
other words, interference from this form of authority is non-dominating because it 
works in the common good (1997: 68). Indeed, ensuring non-domination, for neo-
republicans, might involve a very extensive degree of state interference in the lives of 
individuals. As Pettit puts it, republicanism is a theory of government, and it involves 
a project of building modern institutions of government (130).  
So, for neo-republicans, freedom depends on the structuring of institutions, while for 
La Boétie freedom might be said to be the ontological condition of the individual and 
it proceeds from acts of self-emancipation. Indeed, we might understand La Boétie’s 
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conception of freedom as a form of de-instituting action, which neither destroys 
existing institutions nor creates new ones in their place, but rather suspends their 
effects altogether by withdrawing consent and legitimacy from them. Indeed, Raffaele 
Laudani situates La Boétie within a modern genealogy of disobedience in which 
political action always takes extra-institutional forms, because the real threat to 
liberty, as far as La Boétie is concerned, ‘lurks in the logic of unitary command 
implied in the institution.’ (Laudani 2013: 36) The problem, for La Boétie, in placing 
our trust in institutions as guardians of freedom is that, however benignly intentioned, 
they contain a tyrannising impulse, a command structure that inevitably tends towards 
domination. Freedom is expressed not primarily in terms of constructing and 
cooperating with institutions that ‘track our interests’, but with the negative gesture of 
refusal. As John Holloway (2010: 17) puts it, with specific reference to La Boétie, 
‘The break begins with Refusal, with No.’ La Boétie’s republicanism is primarily a 
republicanism of civil disobedience rather than a republicanism of institutions. 
Anarcho-republicanism 
If indeed La Boétie’s republican theory of freedom as non-domination is not reliant 
on institutions but on the withdrawal of consent and acts of self-emancipation, then it 
is no doubt a strange form of republicanism – one that differs sharply from more 
commonplace interpretations and has a more anarchistic orientation.8 While La Boétie 
makes rhetorical references throughout his Discours to classic republican polities and 
institutions, and while Montaigne reflected on his friend’s admiration for the Venetian 
constitution9 it is clear that the defence of institutions – even republican ones – is not 
La Boétie’s real aim. Here my reading of La Boétie differs sharply from that of Marta 
García-Alonso (2013), who offers a ‘constitutionalist’ interpretation of La Boétie, and 
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argues that his relevance to the republican conception of liberty as non-domination 
lies in his defence of the institution of parliament. While La Boétie was indeed a 
member of the Parlement of Bordeaux and defended its autonomy, there is little 
evidence in the Discours itself that institutions of this kind play any significant role in 
safeguarding or promoting liberty. Indeed, La Boétie’s anti-monarchist ethos in the 
Discours seems to directly contradict Alonso’s claim that ‘The Discourse can also be 
read as a legal plea in defence of the traditional view: the Parliament should play a 
crucial role in the politics of the Kingdom, supporting a monarchy with limited 
powers’. (17) It is suggested here that hints of this traditionalist defence of monarchy 
may have been toned down as a result of the editing of the text immediately following 
the French Revolution. However, I do not find this claim at all plausible. The general 
tenor of the Discours is one of unmistakable opposition to the rule of the One, 
whether a tyrant or even a monarch whose rule is inherited rather than seized by force 
of arms. Indeed, La Boétie shows how tyranny can emerge through the circumstance 
of hereditary rule: ‘Those who are born kings are commonly little better [than 
tyrants]; being born and brought up in the womb of tyranny, they imbibe a tyrant’s 
nature with their mother’s milk.’ (47) Even democratically elected kings are not 
immune from this tyrannical temptation: ‘Elected monarchs treat the people like bulls 
to be tamed…’ (48). Furthermore, we recall, as mentioned at the start, La Boétie’s 
fundamental disagreement with Ulysses’ claim about the advantages of being 
governed by one individual. There is little to suggest, then, that La Boétie put much 
store in a monarchy, even one with constitutionally limited powers – there was always 
the risk that even the most benign monarch could exceed the traditional limits of his 
authority and become tyrannical. Indeed, it is this suspicion of the rule of the one and 
its potential for arbitrariness that places La Boétie much more squarely in the 
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republican camp than, as it is claimed by Alonso (17), any supposed defence of 
constitutional monarchy. While I do not deny that La Boétie sees a place for 
institutions in the defence of freedom, and is concerned with civic forms – hence his 
references to Roman republican law and the Spartan constitution, for instance – I 
would argue that the real direction of his thinking goes beyond institutions and laws 
towards the individual’s self-emancipation and rediscovery of her own freedom, as 
well as towards the fostering of autonomous relations of equality, solidarity and 
companionship. 
If La Boétie’s republican ethos does not lie primarily in the defence of institutions, 
how then should it be interpreted? Here we must consider La Boétie’s importance to 
the anarchist tradition of political thought. The Discours has long been considered an 
early anarchist text.10 The claim that all political power really rests on voluntary 
servitude – while it might give rise to a certain pessimism11 – has always been 
understood by anarchists in an emancipatory sense, as a call to resistance against 
authority and to the withdrawal of consent.12 This idea had a big influence particularly 
on the non-violent tradition of civil disobedience within anarchism, appealing to 
thinkers such as Henry David Thoreau, Benjamin R. Tucker, and Leo Tolstoy.13 The 
anarchist anthropologist, Pierre Clastres (1994: 93-104) who studied ‘primitive’ 
stateless societies in the Amazon, took as central La Boétie’s thesis that the natural 
desire for freedom gave way to an unnatural desire for authority and the division 
between oppressor and oppressed. Later postanarchist theory has also drawn on La 
Boétie’s thinking in its emphasis on the fluidity and reversibility of power relations 
and the ever-present possibilities of freedom (see Newman 2016). 
My claim here is that La Boétie’s thinking might be understood in terms of a certain 
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anarcho-republicanism, in which domination is countered not through laws which, 
while important to some degree in upholding liberty (we must remember after all tha 
La Boétie was a law student and a legislator) do not in themselves provide sufficient 
protection against tyranny, nor serve as the impetus for the initial act of resistance to 
power that is the well-spring of freedom. While La Boétie praises the Spartan 
constitution and the lawgiver Lycurgus, and while he condemns Caesar for destroying 
the laws of the Roman republican, he also claims that tyrants can come to power 
through constitutional and democratic means (47); and that the system of patronage 
surrounding the tyrant means the crimes of his lackeys and dependents are immune 
from legal accountability (‘they exempt themselves from the laws and get out of 
trouble thanks to the protection of those above them’) (64). While, like many 
republican thinkers of an earlier tradition, there is a complex interplay in La Boétie 
between civic forms and internalised domination, there is nevertheless a sense in 
which his understanding of freedom is not something that can be adequately 
expressed or enshrined in law and exceeds institutional form; it is, rather, forged 
through an alternative patterning of relations between autonomous individuals (see 
also Abensour 2011: 329-348). Unlike the neo-republican veneration of the rule of 
law, La Boétie’s focus is on showing how freedom might emerge ‘organically’ 
through a renewal of the natural bonds of companionship between individuals. Laws, 
while important, do not have the same force as love and solidarity.  
It might seem paradoxical, at first glance, to speak of anarcho-republicanism, given 
that republicanism is typically associated with a certain form of state (the ‘free state’) 
and anarchism usually implies the rejection of state authority in whatever form. 
However, anarchism shares the republican concern about the inequalities of power 
that exist at all levels of society: between capitalists and workers; between men and 
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women; between adults and children, and so on, seeing these as relationships of 
domination or potential domination that must be contested and overcome. In seeking 
to identify and contest unequal power relationships that leave people vulnerable to the 
arbitrary will of others, anarchism has some common ground with republicanism (see 
also Kinna and Prichard). Yet, an anarchist republicanism would radically disagree 
with neo-republican theory in its reliance on state institutions to prevent arbitrary 
power relationships, drawing attention to the way that state interference itself, even if 
constitutionally regulated, produces its own multiple forms of domination – from the 
surveillance and overregulation of the lives of its citizens to intense forms of legal 
punishment and coercion. Would we not say, for instance, that the prisoner who has 
been punished according to the letter of the law, undergoes in his or her incarceration 
a most extreme form of domination?14 So it is not only arbitrary authority that 
threatens liberty, but the smooth, regular application of even democratically decided 
laws.  
In contrast to this form of republicanism, the nineteenth century anarchist Mikhail 
Bakunin affirmed an alternative socialist kind. While the ‘political republican’ exalts 
the state and its laws, invoking a ‘republic of citizens’, the socialist republican affirms 
a ‘republic of men’. This really touches on the key difference between anarchist 
republicanism and the more familiar republicanism of institutions and laws. Anarchist 
republicanism, or anarcho-republicanism as I prefer to call it, is a form of 
republicanism without a state – a republicanism that affirms people in their common 
humanity and sees their freedom as existing beyond the state, in free federations and 
communes, for instance; whereas political republicanism needs, indeed, sacralises, the 
state and sees people only as citizens of the state. According to Bakunin: ‘Liberty, to a 
political republican, is an empty word, it is the liberty of a willing slave, a devoted 
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victim of the State. Being always ready to sacrifice his own liberty, he will willingly 
sacrifice the liberty of others.’ (Bakunin 1971: 118-119) While republicanism (or in 
Bakunin’s terminology ‘political republicanism’) opposes itself to slavery, in seeing 
the state and its laws as the only way to avert this condition, it neglects the 
domination that comes with the state. Freedom is only possible, according to Bakunin 
and the anarchist tradition, once the state has been abolished.  
La Boétie fits into this model of anarcho-republicanism, but not so much in the sense 
of promoting – as Bakunin did - any sort of violent revolution against state power. 
Rather, La Boétie presents an alternative vision to political domination and voluntary 
servitude, one based on relations of friendship, equality, and solidarity. La Boétie’s 
Discours compares two different ways of living. One is the corrupted and artificial 
condition of voluntary servitude, in which the natural desire for freedom is abandoned 
and sacrificed to the tyrant. We enter the tyrant’s pyramid of relations, and seek out 
for ourselves a place in the hierarchy of power, henceforth condemned to a life of 
dependency, uncertainty and fear typified by the courtier; or one becomes like the 
masses of others who serve and obey the tyrant very much to their own disadvantage. 
There is, however, another way of life, one more natural to us, in which individuals 
relate to each other freely and recognise one another as equals. Instead of the artificial 
bonds of servitude, fear and mistrust, or the state of enthrallment to the figure of the 
One, people come together on the basis of comradeship, brotherly love and mutual 
regard. Indeed, where there is the mutual recognition of equality there is no possibility 
of slavery: ‘And nobody can imagine that nature has placed anyone in a position of 
servitude since she has made each of us the companion of all others.’ (La Boétie 
1988: 45) This is very similar to the inter-subjective experience of equality and 
mutual regard that characterises the condition of non-domination for republicans. This 
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goes, as Pettit says, ‘with being able to look the other in the eye, confident in the 
shared knowledge that it is not by their leave that you pursue your innocent, non-
interfering choices… You are a somebody in relation to them, not a nobody.’ (1998: 
71) 
The ethical and political challenge of La Boétie’s thesis, then, is to foster a different 
patterning of individuals, one that is much closer to their natural predisposition. For 
the anarchist thinker, Gustav Landauer, who was profoundly influenced by La Boétie 
and who translated the Discours into German, this meant a withdrawal from existing 
social relations and the creation of alternative ways of relating to one another: ‘The 
state is a social relationship; a certain way of people relating to one another. It can be 
destroyed by creating new social relationships; i.e., by people relating to one another 
differently.’ (Landauer 2010: 213-214) We can see reflected here La Boétie’s idea 
that political power falls apart when people turn their eyes away from the One, by 
whom they had hitherto been enchanted, and towards one another. The radical insight 
La Boétie gives us is that political power is not a thing, that it has no real substance, 
but is simply a series of relationships that can be transformed and reconstituted in 
different directions, from domination to freedom. 
Central here is the possibility of love and friendship, which for La Boétie is the real 
ethical (and political) counterpoint to tyranny. What is truly characteristic of the 
tyrant is that he has no friends, only servants and accomplices who are bound to him 
through fear and self-interest: ‘There is no doubt that the tyrant is never loved, and 
loves nobody… Where there is cruelty, treachery and injustice there can be no 
friendship.’ (69) The loneliness and isolation of the tyrant mirrors the loneliness and 
isolation of those who serve him. By contrast, as La Boétie says, ‘Friendship is a 
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sacred word, it is a holy thing, and it exists only between good people, and is kindled 
only my mutual esteem… What gives you confidence that you can rely on a friend is 
the knowledge you have of his integrity…’ (69). 
Friendship, therefore, is the very opposite of domination: it relies upon mutual regard 
and trust. Unlike the master, whose arbitrariness creates uncertainty and insecurity, 
one finds in the friend qualities that allow him to be trusted. The relationship between 
friends is a relationship between equals. While of course we should not be blind to the 
gender and class distinctions that would seem to be implicit in these homosocial 
bonds of male friendship, we can nevertheless say that La Boétie gives us a glimpse 
into another way of life, an anarchist way of life, in which love and friendship take 
the place of domination and submission, and in which the bonds between individuals 
are formed freely and autonomously. La Boétie’s republic is a republic of friends 
rather than a republic of laws and institutions. 
Conclusion 
While La Boétie’s anarcho-republicanism departs from more standard conceptions in 
its emphasis on autonomous relations between individuals who recover their desire to 
be free, rather than on the presence of laws and institutions, I have argued that his 
thinking is nevertheless driven by the same concern with the problem of arbitrary 
power that characterises these approaches. At the same time, La Boétie’s central 
concept of voluntary servitude reveals many of the limitations of the neo-republican 
model of domination as an unequal and hierarchical relationship between agents. Not 
only does voluntary servitude show that domination can take different forms – 
particularly the ideological domination present in learnt habits of obedience and 
rituals of authority – but, more radically, it points to the most troubling dimension at 
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the basis of all power relationships: the problem of self-domination. The active desire 
for one’s own servitude, and the voluntary relinquishment of freedom, is simply not 
considered within the neo-republican model.  
Furthermore, in bringing to light the radical instability of all power relations, I have 
shown how La Boétie’s theory of voluntary servitude goes beyond the neo-republican 
model of freedom: freedom should be understood as an ontological condition of the 
subject, rather than as something dependent on external conditions. This leads to an 
alternative conception of republican ethics – or what one might call civic virtue – in 
which freedom is experienced primarily through acts of self-emancipation, refusal and 
civil disobedience, rather than through adherence to public institutions. My contention 
therefore is that La Boétie’s notion of voluntary servitude, in pointing to the 
undecidability of freedom and domination, expands the republican category of liberty 
and opens up the possibility of a new kind of ethical and political space constituted by 
freely formed relations of solidarity and friendship. 
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1 I rely on the English translation of Discours de La Servitude Volontaire, ou 
Contr’Un by Malcom Smith, based on his edition of the French version of the text 
originally published in Textes Litteraires Francais series in 1987. 
2 This picture of La Boétie is complicated by the fact that ten years after he wrote the 
Discours, he wrote a text that seemed to reach very different political conclusions. 
Written against the backdrop of the Wars of Religion, and as a pragmatic solution to 
the problem of religious conflict, Memoires sur la pacification des troubles (see La 
Boétie 1983) argues, on the one hand, for religious freedom, and even the right of the 
individual to follow the dictates of his own conscience rather than the religious edicts 
of the king – and here there is some consistency with his earlier radical work; and, on 
the other hand, against religious tolerance and, in particular, against public displays of 
religious difference. Religious dissent is seen as a source of instability and division 
within a kingdom. There is a question about the relationship between the two texts, 
one that explicitly affirms dissent, the other that counsels against it. Some suggest that 
there is a continuity between these two seemingly different faces of La Boétie (see 
Podoksik 2003: 83-95), whereas I would insist on their radical opposition. Whether 
this can be put down to La Boétie’s later role as parliamentarian and a servant of the 
king, or the difference between a youthful exuberance and a later more conservative 
outlook, or even to the controversy that the two texts may not have been authored by 
the same person, are questions I leave aside here. My concern is only with the 
Discours itself and what I see as being the radical implications and emancipatory 
thrust of his theory of voluntary servitude. 
3 The text was unofficially published and circulated under the title le Contr’Un (the 
Anti-One, or Anti-Dictator). 
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4 There are some recent exceptions. See Sparling (2013: 483-509); and Terrel (2013: 
55-60). 
5 For instance, Sébastien Charles argues that La Boétie’s text actually expresses a 
profound distrust of the people, who are considered unreliable, ignorant, easily duped 
and prone to the seductions of tyranny because they profit by it: ‘le peuple étant 
toujours prêt à suivre les mauvais exemples ainsi que les fauteurs de trouble’ (see 
Charles 1992: 278). It is therefore, Charles argues, anachronistic in the extreme to see 
La Boétie as any sort of democrat on the side of the people. While I do not see La 
Boétie as a democrat – indeed he makes clear the way that tyranny can emerge 
through democracy – and while I do not seek to downplay the reservations he at times 
expresses about the political capacities of the people, I would nevertheless insist that 
the general tenor of the Discours is emancipatory rather conservative; there is an 
ethico-political challenge to work oneself out of the trap of voluntary servitude and to 
rediscover one’s will to be free. 
6 Spinoza commented on the fact that people, under the spell of the tyrant, ‘will fight 
for their servitude as if they were fighting for their own deliverance, and will not 
think it humiliating but supremely glorious to spill their blood and sacrifice their lives 
for the glorification of a single man.’ (2007: 16)  
7 Even though Machiavelli believed that one of the two humours of the city was the 
desire of the people to not be dominated, he was nevertheless keenly aware of the 
difficulties people had in preserving their liberty and, indeed, how they could become 
accustomed to servitude: ‘And such difficulty is reasonable; because that people is 
nothing else other than a brute animal, which (although by nature ferocious and wild) 
has always been brought up in prison and servitude, (and) which later being left by 
chance free in a field, (and) not being accustomed to (obtain) food or not knowing 
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where to find shelter for refuge, becomes prey to the first one who seeks to enchain it 
again.’ (Discourses Book I, Ch16.) This is very similar to La Boétie’s description of 
how our natural desire for freedom is lost as we become habituated into obedience – 
although rather than being like wild animals, men are like animals who have been 
tamed and domesticated (see 46). 
8 Ephraim Podoksik (2003: 90) argues that La Boétie’s belief that liberty is our 
natural condition leads to an apolitical indifference to institutional arrangements that 
has clear anarchistic orientations. Curiously, however, Podoksik reads this anti-
institutionalism as a form of conservatism and quietism - a ‘private anarchism’ (95) - 
that at times counsels obedience to authority, thus explaining, it is claimed, La 
Boétie’s later position in favour of the suppression of religious dissent in the 
Memoires. In my view this is a somewhat perverse reading that goes against the grain 
of La Boétie’s earlier text. 
9 In any case, La Boétie himself lamented the loss of the desire for liberty that 
characterised Venetian society under the rule of the Great Doge, harkening back 
instead to an earlier republican era in Venice in which freedom was more highly 
prized. 
10 La Boétie appears, for instance, in Peter Marshall’s comprehensive survey of 
anarchism (see 2008: 109-122). At the same time, this anarchist interpretation of La 
Boétie is very much contested (see Shaefer 1998: 1-30). 
11 For instance, Nannerl O. Keohane (1977: 119-130) argues that: ‘La Boétie’s 
premises are anarchistic. He opposes all forms of institutionalised authority, official 
domination among men. His conclusion, however, is not that of an anarchist at all. 
This is a profoundly pessimistic work in which the intricacies of the psychology of 
authority and customary obedience are made so clear that no practical alternatives are 
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proposed, and no counsels for revolutionary action can reasonably be given.’ (127) I 
have argued, however, that La Boétie’s solution to the problem of tyranny and 
political authority lies not in revolutionary action as such – least of all that led by a 
vanguard – but rather in changing the relationship one has with oneself and 
overcoming one’s own condition of voluntary obedience; in other words in the 
cessation of giving oneself to another, whereupon political authority loses its 
foundation. While this might seem a rather impractical, indeed abstract, answer to the 
problem of domination, it can be regarded as the first and necessary step taken in any 
political project of freedom. In this sense, I would dispute Nannerl’s claim that La 
Boétie’s conclusions are pessimistic. On the contrary, in pointing to the fragility and 
vulnerability of power relationships and the ever-present possibilities of freedom, his 
conclusions are rather optimistic: ‘Resolve to be slaves no more, and you are free.’ 
(44) 
12 For an alternative, emancipatory reading of La Boétie, see Abensour (2011: 329-
348).  
13 Leo Tolstoy attributes to La Boétie the discovery that people are kept in subjection, 
not through coercion, but through a lie or illusion that they are complicit in; and 
furthermore the idea that those who are suppressed today can dispel this lie and free 
themselves by ‘abstaining from taking part in the violence that is only possible 
through their co-operation.’ (1948: 45) 
14 Pettit says: ‘The parliament and the police officer, then, the judge or the prison 
warder, may practice non-dominating interference, provided… that a suitably 
constraining, constitutional arrangement works effectively.’ (65) 
